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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we extended the linear dynamical model of [Brown, V., Paulus, P. B. (1996). A simple
dynamic model of social factors in group brainstorming. Small Group Research, 27, 91–114] on two
accounts. First, we modelled the sequential type brainstorming using impulsive differential equations
by treating each category as an impulse and tested its validity in the two experiments that investigated
and demonstrated the beneficial effects of sequential priming and memory in individual brainstorming.
Finally, we considered the nonlinear case of brainstorming in writing or brainwriting where dyads
exchanged their ideas in a written format and that eliminated negative factors occurring in oral
brainstorming (e.g., evaluation apprehension, free-riding, production blocking) and enhanced the upward
performancematching, and conducted the second experiment in order to test its validity in this paradigm
with the effects of sequential priming and memory. Comparisons showed good agreement between
results of experiments and those of the mathematical model.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Use of dynamical systems in areas like population dynamics
and spread of an epidemic is well established (González, Huerta-
Sánchez, Ortiz-Nieves, Vázquez-Alvarez, & Kribs-Zaleta, 2003).
Other relatively new areas of research that are modeled through
dynamical systems include attention and interference, non station-
ary versions of the random walk model of choice response time,
models of human memory (Heath, 2000), perceptual segmenta-
tion (Van Leeuwen, Steyvers, & Nooter, 1997) and brainstorming
(Brown & Paulus, 1996). Of these areas, Brown and Paulus (1996)
have for the first time developedmodeling brainstormingwith dy-
namic systems. Obviously, despite this pioneering study, thismod-
eling is not an end story for the future studies in the brainstorming
area. Instead, some modifications or revisions for such modeling,
in its content, should be required for scientific advancement be-
cause knowledge in modeling has rapidly progressed and changed
from the first publication of brainstormingmodeling, to now. From
this standpoint, we tried to develop the model based on the im-
pulsive differential equations, and nonlinear case of brainstorming
in writing in which the previous modeling of brainstorming was
not taken into consideration. Before giving detailed information
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doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2009.03.003about modeling in this paper, it would be better to give some ideas
about brainstorming concepts, studies first, and then to demon-
stratemodelingwith its validity bymeans of experimental studies.
Since the publication of Osborn’s first influential book
(Osborn, 1957), group brainstorming has become a widely used
idea-generation method in many organizations in today’s world
(Parnes, 1992; Paulus, 2000; Paulus & Brown, 2003; Paulus,
Dugosh, Dzindolet, Coskun, & Putman, 2002; Sutton & Har-
gadon, 1996). Osborn (1957) developed the four brainstorming
rules as ways to improve group productivity or creativity: (1) crit-
icism is ruled out; (2) freewheeling is welcome; (3) quantity is
wanted over quality, and (4) improvement and combination of
ideas are sought. Osborn claimed that an individual brainstorm-
ing in a group would produce almost twice as many ideas than
brainstorming alone. His claim has led to an enormous number of
experimental studies indicating robust evidence that interactive
brainstorming groups tended to generate fewer ideas than nom-
inal brainstorming groups (groups consisting of the same number
of individuals working alone (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Mullen, John-
son, & Salas, 1991; Stroebe & Diehl, 1995)).
In the literature, four basic explanations have been offered for
the productivity loss in interactive group brainstorming. These are
evaluation apprehension or social anxiety (feeling of some fear
in expressing the potential ideas in front of a group (Camacho &
Paulus, 1995; Collaros & Anderson, 1969; Harari & Graham, 1975;
Mullen et al., 1991)), free-riding or social loafing (the tendency to
rely on the efforts of others to accomplish the task (Borgatta &
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& Bruun, 1983; Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993)), production blocking
(the inability to express the ideas because someone else is talking:
(Diehl & Stroebe, 1991; Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2003)), and
downward matching (the tendency for group members to match
their performance to the least productive member (Paulus et al.,
2002; Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993)).
In addition to these inhibitory factors, the twomain tendencies
occur in interactive brainstorming groups. The first tendency
is that interactive groups as well as nominal groups typically
tend to lower their idea generation performance over the later
periods of the brainstorming session (Coskun, 2000; Nijstad et al.,
2003; Paulus et al., 2002). This may reflect a reduced availability
of ideas, a reduced motivation over time, or some degree of
cognitive fixation (Smith, 1995). The second one is that groups
have a tendency to converge on similar categories of ideas (Brown,
Tumeo, Larey, & Paulus, 1998; Larey & Paulus, 1999; Paulus &
Brown, 2003) and to scan only a small number of the ideas
from available cognitive categories (Brown et al., 1998; Connolly,
Routhieaux, & Schneider, 1993).
In an attempt to eliminate these inhibitory factors, researchers
have been interested in techniques for improving the performance
of brainstorming groups. For example, forming interactive groups
with low anxious members was found to close the production
gap between interactive and nominal brainstormers (Camacho
& Paulus, 1995). The presentation of the facilitators or rules
designed to improve group interaction and participation were
suggested to eliminate the potential free-riding tendencies (Offner,
Kramer, & Winter, 1996; Oxley, Dzindolet, & Paulus, 1996).
Electronic versions of group brainstorming where participants
generate their ideas simultaneously without blocking each other
but seeing their ideas at the top of the screen have been
suggested for eliminating the production blocking (Diehl &
Stroebe, 1991; Gallupe, Bastianutti, & Cooper, 1991; Nijstad et al.,
2003; Nunamaker, Briggs, & Mittleman, 1995; Valacich, Dennis,
& Conolly, 1994). Downward matching, the tendency of group
members to match their performance with the least productive
member, which was also proposed to be a major factor in
determining a relatively low performance of interactive groups
(Borgatta & Sales, 1953; Camacho & Paulus, 1995; Collaros &
Anderson, 1969; Harari & Graham, 1975; Karau & Williams, 1993;
Kerr & Bruun, 1983), can be eliminated by the provision of
comparison information or a high standard (Coskun, 2000; Paulus
& Dzindolet, 1993).
The terminology specific to this paper is explained as follows:
‘‘Simultaneous brainstorming’’ is the case when all topics to be
discussed are given at once at the beginning of the session;
‘‘Sequential brainstorming’’ is when each topic of discussion is
given at a different time; ‘‘Memory condition’’ is an instruction
on brainstormers to memorize the ideas; The manipulation of
simultaneous versus sequential prompting of ideas is referred to
as a type of ‘priming’.
In this paper,we improve on the linear dynamicmodel of Brown
and Paulus (1996). In their model, they assume that an individual’s
capacity to produce ideas would decay exponentially and that
productivity of an individual would decrease as a function of total
group output, known as blocking. Their final assumption is that if
an individual’s productivity were higher than the group average,
he would decrease his output and vice versa (matching). Cognitive
processes such as idea generation, storage of ideas in memory and
idea output were included in the extended version of the linear
model. Blocking and matching effects were studied in detail in
the paper under hypothetical conditions. In this paper, we tried to
improve the Brown and Paulus’s model on several accounts. First,
we modeled the sequential type (i.e., presenting each component
of the problem one at a time) brainstorming using impulsivedifferential equations by treating each category as an impulse.
Second, we considered the nonlinear case of brainstorming in
writing. Finally, we modeled the memory effect in sequential and
simultaneous cases (i.e., presenting all components of the problem
at once). The last two cases are particularly interesting from a
mathematical point of view. In dynamical systems it is desirable
to have simple, linear models. But, in the case of brainstorming
in writing, matching, inevitably, occurs in a nonlinear way. This is
due to the fact that matching occurs only in the upward fashion
(i.e., the individuals will try to increase their performance when
their performance is lower than that of group’s average and they
will not try to reduce their performance when their performance
is higher than the average). (Brown & Paulus, 1996; Camacho
& Paulus, 1995; Paulus, 2000; Paulus et al., 2002). The memory
condition, finally, gives some complexity to the system by the
introduction of cognitive processes.
We conducted the two independent studies to test the fit
of our model. Even though the effects of memory instruction
(Dugosh, Paulus, Roland, & Yang, 2000) and sequential and
simultaneous priming in oral brainstorming (Coskun, Paulus,
Brown, & Sherwood, 2000) were investigated in the literature, the
present study, consisting of the two experiments, has examined for
the first time the combination of these variables in a single research
paradigm (individual brainstorming and brainwriting paradigm).
The findings of these studies, which would be mentioned later in a
detailed way, did produce new outcomes that were mostly in line
with the predictions of our model.
2. Modelling
Along these lines in the brainstorming literature, modeling
interactive group brainstorming has become one popular field
(Brown & Paulus, 1996; Brown et al., 1998; Coskun et al., 2000).
A linear dynamic model of interactive brainstorming was initially
developed by Brown and Paulus (1996) in order to account for
some of these above mentioned mechanisms or processes. We
should stress that the goal of themodelingwedevelop in this paper
is qualitative mimicry of trends in the data, not quantitative data
fitting.
First, we rewrite the model of Brown and Paulus (1) for
convenience of the reader and then we model the sequential type
brainstorming using impulsive differential equations by treating
each category as an impulse (2). After that, we consider the
nonlinear case of brainstorming in writing ((3) and (4)) and finally
we present the cognitive processes ((5) and (6)).
Consider the following linear dynamical system, given by
Brown and Paulus (1996), which linearly models decay, blocking
and matching but ignores the cognitive processes,
dx
dt
= −Ax− Bx+Mx (1)
where x is a column vector in the n-dimensional real space (n
represents the number of brainstormers), which represents the
rate of idea generation, A, B and M are an n × n real matrices
accounting for the effects of decay in output as the time progresses,
for blocking effects and for matching respectively. The matrix A is
diagonal, with entries of decay coefficients of individuals.
Matrix B is given in the following form,
B =

0 b1 b1 · · · b1
b2 0 b2 · · · b2
b3 b3 0 · · · b3
...
...
...
. . .
...
bn bn bn · · · 0

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entries are zero, as an individual cannot block himself.
M is the matrix modeling matching effects given by,
M =

−m1 m1n− 1
m1
n− 1 · · ·
m1
n− 1
m2
n− 1 −m2
m2
n− 1 · · ·
m2
n− 1
m3
n− 1
m3
n− 1 −m3 · · ·
m3
n− 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
mn
n− 1
mn
n− 1
mn
n− 1 · · · −mn

where mi is the matching coefficient of each person,
mi
n−1xj repre-
sents the effect of the ouput of the jth person on the productivity
of the ith person. Overall effect, given by
∑n
j = 1
(j 6= i)
mi
n−1xj−mixi can
be negative or positive depending on the relative productivity of
the person concerned.
2.1. Sequential brainstorming using impulsive differential equations
Now, we introduce impulses at fixed moments of time, that
is, the solution becomes piecewisely continuous. Consider the
following linear impulsive equation,
dx
dt
= −Ax− Bx+Mx, t 6= θi
x(θ+i ) = x(θ−i )+ di
(2)
where θi are the fixed moments of time when a new category
is introduced, the superscript +(−) denotes the time just after
(before) the impulse and di is a constant column vector which
represents jumps in the solution (sudden increase in the rate of
idea production).
2.2. Brainstorming in writing
Next, we consider brainstorming in writing, in which factors
like social anxiety and blocking do not exist (cf. Paulus et al. (2002)
and Paulus and Yang (2000)). In this case nonlinearity arises from
the fact that matching occurs only in the positive sense, that is,
when the individual’s performance is lower than that of groups
average he or she will try to increase his performance and when
his or her performance is higher than the average he or shewill not
try to reduce his performance. In the simultaneous brainstorming,
modeling is given as,
dx
dt
= −Ax+M(x)x (3)
where the matrix A represents the decay rate and the matrixM(x)
is the nonlinear matching matrix given by
M(x) =

−m1 m1n− 1
m1
n− 1 · · ·
m1
n− 1
m2
n− 1 −m2
m2
n− 1 · · ·
m2
n− 1
m3
n− 1
m3
n− 1 −m3 · · ·
m3
n− 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
mn
n− 1
mn
n− 1
mn
n− 1 · · · −mn

×

H(xr1) H(xr2) H(xr3) · · · H(xrn)
H(xr1) H(xr2) H(xr3) · · · H(xrn)
H(xr1) H(xr2) H(xr3) · · · H(xrn)
...
...
...
. . .
...
H(xr1) H(xr2) H(xr3) · · · H(xrn)
 .H(xri) is theHeaviside unit step function and xri is the relative value
of xi given by xri = ∑Nj = 1
(j 6= i)
xj
n−1 − xi. In the sequential case, the
model is,
dx
dt
= −Ax+M(x)x, t 6= θi
x(θ+i ) = x(θ−i )+ di.
(4)
2.3. Cognitive processes
Cognitive processes include idea generation and storage of ideas
in the short term memory. In Brown and Paulus (1996), decay
coefficient was divided into three parts; decay of idea generation,
decay in storage of ideas in the short term memory and decay
in output. Similarly, blocking was represented in two stages;
blocking at idea generation and blocking at output. However, some
constraints should be imposed on the model of Brown and Paulus.
First, at a fixed moment of time, rate of idea storage cannot exceed
a certain value, for there is a capacity to store ideas. Second, it
is necessary to rule out the possibility of a negative rate of ideas
generated, stored or outputted. So the coupled model including
cognitive processes for the simultaneous and oral brainstorming
is,
dx
dt
= −Ax− Bx+Mx+ Ry
dy
dt
= −Fy+ z − x, z(t) ≥ 0, k ≥ y(t) ≥ 0, x(t) ≥ 0
dz
dt
= −Kz − Ex
(5)
where k is a positive integer, x, y and z are n-dimensional
vectors representing ideas per unit time at output, storage and
generation stages respectively,matricesA, B, andMwere described
in Section 2, K and E are n × n matrices representing decay and
blocking at idea generation stage. Ideas that are retrieved from the
memory are modeled through the diagonal matrix R. Matrix E has
the same shape as B.
The model presented in (5) may become nonlinear due to the
physical and mathematical constraints placed on it. That is, when
stored ideas grow out of its bound, then it will be forced back into
its bound.
Next, we try to extend themodel (5) into the sequential case by,
dx
dt
= −Ax− Bx+Mx+ Ry
dy
dt
= −Fy+ z − x, z(t) ≥ 0, k ≥ y(t) ≥ 0, x(t) ≥ 0
dz
dt
= −Kz − Ex
z(θ+i ) = z(θ−i )+ gi
(6)
where the matrix gi is a constant column vector which represents
jumps in the solution. Here, the impulse is applied at the idea
generation stage, and its effect on the output will be felt indirectly,
with a time lapse. This is plausible, since when a new category
is introduced, brainstormers first will contemplate for a few
moments to generate ideas and then start outputting their ideas.
In summary, there are three parameters in the non cognitive
model; A (decay in output), B (blocking in output) andM (matching
in output). In the cognitive model, seven parameters are used; A,
B and M are the same as the ones in non cognitive case, F and K
represent decay in storage and generation stages, R is the retrieval
parameter and E is blocking at generation stage. In addition to
these, initial rate of idea production for eachmember and the value
of impulses for fixedmoments of time (parameters di and gi) could
be considered as parameters.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of simultaneous and sequential cases.
2.4. Simulations with the mathematical model
Solution of the systems (1)–(6) is carried out using a classical
Runge–Kutta algorithm. In most cases, due to nonlinearities and
complexities of the equations, analytical solutions are not possible.
There are three different cases considered in simulations. In
all of them, decay effects are exponential. In the first case, where
blocking and matching are linearly modeled, simultaneous and
sequential brainstorming concepts are compared with each other
in terms of total rate of idea production. In both simultaneous
and sequential cases, the decay coefficient was chosen to be 0.2
for each person, blocking coefficient to be 0.035 and matching
coefficient to be 0.02. These coefficients are not based on the
experiments and they were chosen this way to simplify the
comparison of two different concepts. However, the rate of idea
production at the beginning of the session for simultaneous and
sequential simulations is chosen to be different and this is based
on experimental evidence (see Fig. 5). Six brainstormers start with
idea production rate of 36 in the simultaneous run and with idea
production rate of 24 in the sequential run. In the sequential
simulation, brainstormers are introduced to a new topic every
five minutes, which results in an increase in idea generation rate,
namely two ideas per minute per person at 5th and 10th min, two
ideas per minute at 15th and 20th min and one idea per minute at
25th min.
This simulation (Fig. 1) supports the idea that sequential
brainstorming is much better than the simultaneous one in terms
of rate of idea production. This estimation will be verified by
experimental results in Section 3.
The second simulation is about cognitive processes of individ-
uals. The Eq. (5) is used to demonstrate the cognitive processes.
In this simulation, the value of decay coefficient used in the first
simulation is distributed among idea generation, storage and out-
put stages equally, whereas the value of blocking coefficient is
distributed equally among idea generation and output stages. Ac-
cording to Eq. (5), matching is done at the output level and its value
is the same as the first simulation. The coefficient R in (5) was cho-
sen such that the total number of ideas produced during 30 min is
equal for sessions produced by cognitive and non-cognitivemodels
and this value of Rwas found to be 0.075.
The rate of idea production at the idea generation stage for
each individual is six ideas perminute initially. As time progresses,
around t = 11.4 min there is a peak in the rate of idea production
at the output stage. By comparing Figs. 1 and 2 one can notice
that the simulation with cognitive processes gives a more realistic
picture of brainstorming than the one with no cognitive processes.
Certainly, at t = 0, the rate of idea production at the output stage
should not be the maximum but zero.5
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In the last simulation, brainstorming in writing, is the only
nonlinear case. In this case, social anxiety, free riding and blocking
do not exist, only nonlinear matching and linear decay effects are
considered (Fig. 3).
This is the only case with nonlinear effects. Clearly, the brain-
storming in writing format is superior to the oral brainstorming
one. This outcome is due to the effects of upward matching, no
blocking, and no social anxiety in brainwriting.
Table 1 gives the values for coefficients used in the simulations.
Discussion about coefficients was given in the preceding para-
graphs of this section.
Overall conclusions for themodeling of brainstorming are; first,
in oral brainstorming, the model with cognitive processes gives a
more realistic picture than the one without cognitive processes;
second, nonlinear effects due to upward matching are the only
interaction between the individuals in written brainstorming and
give a clear advantage to it over oral brainstorming. In Section 3,
experiments are explained in detail. The first experiment, carried
out with nominal brainstormers, provides an average decay
coefficient which will be used in simulations of modeling,
whereas the second experiment allows us to compare the
simulationswith experimental results for the priming andmemory
conditions.
3. Experiments
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and validity of the last
simulation, we tried to assess the effects of cognitive stimulation
with memory and sequential priming in the following two
experiments. The first study was conducted in individual (or
nominal) brainstorming in a written format, whereas the second
one was done in a brainwriting paradigm.
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Coefficients used in the simulations.
Simulations Decay coefficient (s) Blocking
coefficient (s)
Matching coefficient R Initial valuesa Value of jumpsb
Simultaneous case (noncognitive), Figs. 1–3 0.2 0.035 0.02 – 36 –
Sequential case (noncognitive), Fig. 1 2
2
0.2 0.035 0.02 – 24 1
1
1
Brainstorming in writing (noncog.), Fig. 3 0.2 – 0.02 (nonlinear) – 36 –
The case with cognitive processes, Fig. 2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.0175 0.0175 0.02 0.075 36 –
a Rate of idea production for each member at t = 0.
b Increase in the value of rate of production at 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th and 25th min (value of increase is the same for each member).3.1. Experiment 1
In the first experiment nominal brainstormers (who brain-
stormed separately from each other or without any interaction)
were included for at least three reasons. First, these individuals
enable us to clearly evaluate cognitive influences without any
external prevention such as group interaction. Second, so far, an
evaluation for the effects of memory instruction (e.g., memory and
no-memory conditions) has not been done in individual brain-
storming. Previous research has demonstrated that the beneficial
effect of memory instruction (e.g., an instruction for memorization
of ideas during the idea generation process)was only evident in the
later session of brainwriting groups rather than in the early session
of it (Dugosh et al., 2000; Paulus & Yang, 2000). Paulus and Yang
(2000) have compared interactive brainwriting groups, who were
given memory instruction, with nominal groups without a mem-
ory instruction. In other words, they had no nominal groups with
memory instruction so as to compare with those without memory
instruction in their research paradigm. Third, the effect of memory
instructionwith the two types of priming (e.g., sequential or simul-
taneous priming) has not been assessed together yet, even though
there was research evidence for the beneficial effect of sequential
priming (e.g., priming a part of problem once at a time) over a si-
multaneous one (e.g., priming all part of problem at once: 30). In
the view of associate memory, ideas or concepts are assumed to
connect to each other in an organized fashion, called associative
memory or a semantic network (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Similar or
related ideas (e.g., apple–orange) havemore connected bonds than
dissimilar ones (e.g., apple–river). Thus when activated, the con-
cepts that have strong connections with other concepts are more
easily retrieved from memory than those that have weak connec-
tions (Brown et al., 1998). According to the associative memory
perspective, memorization should lead participants to carefully at-
tend or store ideas and retrieve more concepts from their mem-
ory, which in turn facilitates the generation of new or unique ideas.
All subjects were randomly assigned to memory condition (mem-
ory and no-memory) and priming (sequential and simultaneous)
conditions.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred-forty freshman students enrolled in Psychology
Courses at the Abant Izzet Baysal University (AIBU), located in Bolu,
Turkey, participated in the study in an exchange for experimental
credit. The participants were randomly assigned to either priming
(sequential and simultaneous) or memory (memory and no-
memory) conditions. There were 35 participants in each condition.
Procedure
All participants, being sat apart from each other, were tested
in a classroom setting. After the provision of an informed consent
form and collection of it from participants, a second page, which
included detailed instructions about the brainstorming procedureand its four rules, was given to the participants. A brief explanation
for each rule was also provided and read aloud to all participants
as they followed along. Upon the presentation of brainstorming
rules, similar to the instructions used in the Paulus andYang (2000)
study, all participantswere instructed towrite their ideas on paper,
not to talk each other during their idea generation session, and to
just use simple sentences without worrying about grammar.
Then the participants were randomly assigned to priming con-
ditions. The Thumbs Problem (generating ideas about difficulties or
advantages of using an extra thumb on each hand) were given to
the participants and divided into its four components (e.g., music,
hygiene, clothing, and communication). This decomposition was
made on the basis of a previously used data set in one piece of
research (Dugosh et al., 2000) and the number of subcategories
of these components (music (28), hygiene (24), clothing (20), and
communication (19); M = 22.75, S.D. = 4.11). All participants
were given a package that included sequential and simultaneous
manipulations on it. The participants in the sequential priming
condition were instructed to generate ideas for each given com-
ponent every five minutes. However, those in the simultaneous
priming condition were provided with all the components of the
Thumbs Problem on the first page.
Prior to the start of the idea generation session, the participants
were randomly assigned to the memory conditions. The partici-
pants in the memory condition were instructed to examine all of
the ideas carefully and were provided with information that there
would be a memory test at the end of the brainstorming session
(Paulus & Yang, 2000). Those in the no-memory condition were
given no such information. After these manipulations, all partic-
ipants were led to brainstorm on the given problem for a five-
minute session. At the end of this session, all participants were
instructed to turn the next page (e.g., second, third, and fourth
pages) at the end of five minutes and keep generating ideas. This
procedure continued until the session was over. At the end of the
session, the experimenter ended the brainstorming session andde-
briefed and thanked all participants for their participation.
Results
Coding
Two independent raters, one of whom repeated the coding
for 40% of the transcripts and the other one for all of them,
checked the transcripts for repetitive ideas and calculated a new
total for nonrepetitive ideas. The interrater reliability coefficients
(Cronbach’sα) between these raters for both the nonrepetitive and
repetitive ideas were 0.99. The number of nonrepetitive ideas was
used as a productivity/performance index or dependent variable.
Performance
The data were analyzed by a means of 2 (the type of priming:
sequential and simultaneous priming) × 2 (memory condition:
memory and no memory conditions) between-subject ANOVA de-
sign. This analysis indicated a significant effect of memory con-
dition on the idea generation performance, F(1, 136) = 5.61,
258 H. Coskun, O. Yilmaz / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 53 (2009) 253–264sequential-memory
sequential-nomemory
simultaneous-memory
simultaneous-nomemory
1
2
3
4
5
6
10 15
0
7
Id
ea
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
Ra
te
(N
um
be
r o
f Id
ea
s /
 5-
mi
nu
te
 in
te
rv
a
l)
5 20
Time (minutes)
Fig. 4. Effect of memory instruction on productivity in individual brainstorming.
sequential priming
simultaneous priming
10 15
R
at
e 
of
 Id
ea
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n
(N
um
be
r o
f Id
ea
s /
 5 
mi
nu
te
)
5 20
Time (minutes)
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
7
Fig. 5. Priming and time interaction on performance in experiment 1.
p < .03. The participants in the memory condition (M = 20.13)
generated more ideas than those in the no-memory condition
(M = 18.17). However, priming effect (F(1, 136) = 1.04, p >
.31) and the interaction effect between memory and priming
(F(1, 136) = 2.26, p > .14)were not significant (Fig. 4).
We also analyzed the idea generation performance over five
minute time periods by 2 × 2 × 4 (time periods: 0–5 min, 5–
10 min, 10–15 min, and 15–20 min periods) analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with the last factor as a within subject design. Time
periods had a significant effect on performance, F(3, 408) =
43.63, p < .0001. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the idea generation
performance linearly decreased over time periods, F(1, 136) =
89.38, p < .0001. Time period x priming interaction was also
significant, F(3, 408) = 12.65, p < .0001, indicating a sharper
decline of the idea-generation performance in the simultaneous
priming condition than sequential priming condition (Fig. 5).
In addition, time period x memory interaction was significant,
F(3, 408) = 4.05, p < .008. This interaction reflected a sharper
decline in the no-memory condition than memory condition
over the later time periods of brainstorming session (Fig. 6).
Moreover, time period x priming xmemory interaction effect was
significant, F(3, 408) = 9.15, p < .0001, indicating the best
performance in the sequential priming and memory condition
and the worst performance in the simultaneous priming and no-
memory condition towards the end of brainstorming session.
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 1 indicated thatmemory instruction
enhanced the idea generation performance. This gain was almost
11% when compared to the no-memory condition. This finding is
consistent with the findings of previous research (Paulus & Yang,
2000), indicating the beneficial effect of memory especially in
the later periods of brainstorming. The present study employed
20-min sessions in contrast to 15-min sessions in the previousmemory
nomemory
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Fig. 6. Memory and time interaction on performance in experiment 1.
research (Paulus & Yang, 2000). Longer time periods may be
one appropriate strategy for assessing the effects of memory
instruction on the idea generation performance because it may
help the idea generation process when participants are about to
run out of their potential ideas. In such a time period, participants
may easily retrieve their ideas from their memory on which they
build with the help of memory instruction. At the beginning of
the session, memory instruction may lead participants to store
more ideas in their memory, which later facilitate the retrieval
of potential ideas when they get exhausted or have no additional
ideas.
According to the associate memory perspective, memory
instruction may especially enhance one’s span of attention to the
ideas generated by others, and the capacity of short-termmemory.
Since there is no other person in the nominal situation to be
paid attention, memory instruction should lead one individual to
focus on his or her ideas. An elevated attention should enhance
one’s memory capacity or idea storage as well. This standpoint
suggests that the effect of memory instruction should be stronger
in interactive conditions than nominal conditions. This is because
brainstormers may get more benefit from paying attention to the
ideas of others than focusing on their own ideas. Ideas generated
by others should be more stimulating and diverse than those
generated by one’s own standing. This suggestion was assessed
in Experiment 2 by a means of having brainstormers brainstorm
either in a group or alone.
It should be kept in mind that the beneficial effect of memory
instruction was not evident in the first session of the Paulus and
Yang (2000) study, but evident in that of Experiment 1. This
difference may be due to the methodological difference between
Experiment 1 and the Paulus and Yang (2000) study in a way
that the former study used an individual brainstorming paradigm,
whereas the latter one used a brainwriting paradigm. Keeping
track of ideas and paying attention to the ideas of a partner in a
brainwriting paradigm is a difficult process in the early session
of brainstorming. Such a procedure with a shorter time period
may hinder the difference in performance between nominal and
interactive groups with memory instruction at the first session in
the Paulus and Yang’s (2000) study. With a longer time period,
subjects become familiar with the procedures of brainwriting and
thereby the beneficial effect of memory may occur in the later
session, as was the case in Paulus and Yang (2000) study. Paulus
and Yang (2000) have compared the performance of interactive
groups with memory instruction with that of nominal groups
without memory instruction. However, such a research design
lacked a condition of interactive groups with memory instruction.
These possibilities or methodological concerns were assessed in
Experiment 2.
Experiment 1 showed no significant main effect for priming
on performance. This is inconsistent with the finding of the first
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Coskun et al. (2000) study. This outcome comes from the fact that
all participants were stopped every five minutes and instructed to
turn their page and continue generating ideas. Such a procedure
makes the simultaneous priming similar to the sequential priming
in terms of timing and pauses despite the fact that the participants
in the simultaneous priming condition viewed all categories of the
problem in contrast to those in the sequential priming. Previous
research (Coskun et al., 2000) used 3-min time intervals or
segmentation, whereas Experiment 1 did use 5-min time intervals.
In contrast to longer time intervals or periods, shorter time
intervals (both 3 min and 5 min intervals) may have motivational
aswell as cognitive consequences on performance, thus closing the
performance gap between sequential and simultaneous priming.
Another difference between the former study (Coskun et al., 2000)
and Experiment 1 is that the former one used 10 categories of the
University problem, ranging from broad categories (e.g., campus
life) to narrow ones (e.g., athletic teams), whereas the latter
one had 4 categories of the Thumbs problem, having almost
homogeneous categories in depth. Despite this relative difference,
the findings were robust across these studies.
On the other hand, an interaction between priming and time
periods or intervals indicated that the participants in the sequen-
tial priming were successful at keeping their initial performance
up over sessions, while those in the simultaneous priming condi-
tion lowered their performance level as the brainstorming session
went on. This outcome mimics the finding of the first experiment
(interactive and nominal brainstorming with an oral format) and
the second experiment (nominal brainstormingwith awritten for-
mat) of the previous research (Coskun et al., 2000), both of which
indicated the performance difference between the simultaneous
and sequential priming was greater in the later periods than in the
early periods. In other words, the idea generation performance de-
clined more over time with simultaneous priming than that with
sequential priming.
From this experiment, decay coefficient at the output stage
can be obtained and used in Experiment 2. By exponential
curve fitting in Figs. 5 and 6, decay coefficients are found to be
0.03 ideas/min and 0.015 ideas/min for the simultaneous cases
with no memory and with memory respectively. Also, we notice
from the figures that, at t = 0, brainstormers in simultaneous and
sequential sessions had a different number of ideas on average; 7
ideas for the former and 5.5 ideas for the latter. In this sense, such
a modeling was in line with the outcomes (i.e. both experimental
results andmodel’s outcomes) of the Coskun et al. study (2000) but
with a different assumption (i.e., impulsive differential equations)
underlying modeling.
3.2. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we investigated the effects of priming and
memory condition in both interactive and nominal brainwriting
conditions, on which no empirical research had been conducted
earlier. Brainwriting procedure, initially developed by Paulus and
Yang (2000), includes exchanging ideas in a small group with
a writing format. Such a procedure is assumed to eliminate
evaluation apprehension, free-riding, and blocking (Coskun, 2000;
Paulus & Yang, 2000) because it relies on simultaneous writing or
idea generation and identifiable group members. It also enhances
upward matching or competition and cognitive stimulation
because it includes both a procedural pressure for generatingmore
ideas and paying attention to ideas generated by other group
members. In the literature, interactive brainwriting groups or
dyads were found to perform better than nominal brainwriting
ones (Coskun, 2000, 2005a; Paulus & Yang, 2000). However, the
beneficial effect of its cognitive stimulation did not appear inthe early sessions as expected, but it occurred in the later time
periods. Given these considerations, we examined the effects of
memory instruction and priming type in nominal and interactive
dyads with a longer time period (e.g., 20 min time period). It was
hypothesized that interactive brainwriting dyads would generate
more ideas than nominal ones. The individuals with memory
instructionwere also considered to generatemore ideas than those
without memory instruction. Sequential priming would be similar
to simultaneous priming if shorter pauses and timingwere present
in both the two types of priming.
Method
Participants and design
Ninety-eight freshmen students enrolled in Psychology courses
at the AIBU, participated in the study in exchange for exper-
imental credit, and were randomly assigned to either priming
conditions (sequential and simultaneous), memory (memory and
no-memory) or social context (interactive and nominal contexts)
conditions. There were 49 participants in the sequential priming
condition, 49 in the simultaneous priming condition, 50 in the in-
teractive group condition, 48 in the nominal group condition, 49 in
the memory, and 49 in the no memory condition. The participants
in Experiment 2 did not participate in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 in all respects
except for social context manipulations. After the presentation of
brainstorming rules, the participants were randomly assigned to
either nominal or interactive dyad conditions. Interactive dyads
were seated in a rectangular table with two chairs. Nominal dyads
were led to sit apart from each other and provided the four type of
numbered (e.g., the papers numbered with 1, 2, 3, and 4) A4 paper.
Each of the interactive dyads was provided with the four types of
numbered slips with a total of five slips (one-fourth of A4 paper)
and different color pens (black and blue) in order to generate their
ideas.
The participants in the interactive brainwriting condition were
instructed by a means of a brainwriting procedure similar to those
used in the Coskun (2000, 2005a,b) and Paulus and Yang (2000)
study. The procedural instructions for all interactive dyads were
detailed as follows:
‘‘You will write your ideas on paper slips and share these with
your partner. Do not talk to each other while you are doing this.
Youwill eachuse a different color pen towrite downone idea on
the paper slips and pass it to your partner. Youwill then receive
the paper slip from your partner. Read the idea on the slip, add
your own idea, and pass it on. If you finish before receiving your
next slip, you may use another blank slip until one is passed to
you. If you can’t think of any ideas to put on a slip, read the idea
andpass it on.When a slip you started returns to you, read it and
place it in the center of table. This processwill continue until the
session is over. You do not need to make complete sentences
when writing the ideas. Just use simple phrases. Don’t worry
about grammar’’.
The nominal dyads were instructed as follows:
‘‘Youwill need towrite down your ideas on a paper sheet.When
you complete writing them, you should use another blank slip.
Do not talk to each other while you are doing this. You do not
need to make complete sentences when writing the ideas. Just
use simple phrases. Don’t worry about grammar’’.
Then the participants were randomly assigned to either the
sequential priming condition where they were instructed to
generate ideas for each given component of the Thumbs problem
(e.g., music, hygiene, clothing, and communication) at very five
minutes or the simultaneous condition where they were provided
with all components of the problem on the first page.
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Fig. 7. The effect of memory on the idea generation performance in experiment 2.
Prior to the brainstorming session, they were also randomly
assigned to the memory conditions similar to those in Experiment
1. After these manipulations, all participants were instructed to
brainstorm on the given problem for five-minute sessions, turn
to the next page (e.g., second, third, and fourth pages) at the
end of this session and keep generating ideas. At the end of the
brainstorming session, the experimenter debriefed and thanked all
participants for their participation.
Results
Coding
The interrater reliability coefficients between two independent
raters, one of whom repeated the coding for 40% of the transcripts
and the other all of them, for the nonrepetitive and repetitive
ideas were 0.99 and 0.98, respectively. We also calculated each
participant’s recall accuracy by comparing the number of ideas
generated in the session and the number of ideas remembered. The
interrater reliability calculated by Cronbach alpha was .95 for this
measure.
Performance
The data were analyzed by a means of 2 (social context:
interactive and nominal context) × 2 (priming: sequential and
simultaneous priming) × 2 (memory condition: memory and no
memory conditions) between-subject or dyad ANOVA design. This
analysis indicated a significant effect of social context on the idea
generation performance, F(1, 90) = 18.14, p < .0001. Interactive
dyads (M = 49.24) generatedmore ideas than nominal ones (M =
32.54: Fig. 7). Memory instruction also had a significant effect on
performance, F(1, 90) = 6.48, p < .01. The dyads (M = 45.48)
in the memory condition generated more ideas than those (M =
35.63) in the no-memory condition (Fig. 7). Neither othermain nor
interaction effects except for these mentioned above were found
to be significant. Though not being significant, interactive dyads
seemed to benefit more from memory instruction than nominal
ones (The means of interactive dyads for memory is 13.85 and no-
memory is 10.04; whereas those of nominal ones for memory is
8.45 and no-memory is 7.73.), F(1, 90) = 2.74, p > .10.
Further analysis was made over five-minute sessions by a
means of 2 × 2 × 2 × 4 (time periods; 0–5 min, 5–10 min,
10–15 min, and 25–20 min) ANOVA with the last factor (time
periods) as a within-subject (dyad) design. Time had a significant
effect on performance, F(3, 89) = 5.06, p < .002. Trend
analysis indicated that performance linearly decreased over time,
F(1, 90) = 9.57, p < .004, form a mean of 8.33 at the end of five
minute to a mean of 6.79 at the end of twenty minute.
Time x priming interaction also had a significant effect on
performance, F(3, 89) = 4.10, p < .008. This interaction reflected
the fact that dyads in the sequential priming conditionmaintained
almost the same level of idea generation performance over
sessions, whereas those in the simultaneous priming condition
experienced a sharp decrease in performance, especially after thesequential priming
simultaneous priming
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Fig. 8. Comparison of simultaneous and sequential cases.
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Fig. 9. Performances of high performers and low performers in social context.
end of a ten-minute session, andmaintained this low performance
towards the end of the session (Fig. 8). No other significant effects
were found to be significant on performance.
In addition, we examined the performance of an average high
performing member and a low performing member of the dyads
for each experimental condition, in order to obtain a clear picture
of how interactions between two brainstormers differ as a func-
tion of the experimental condition. On the basis of average per-
formance of each dyad, the participants showing above average
performance were defined as high performers, whereas those be-
low average were defined as low performers. Then analysis was
made over five-minute sessions by a means of 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 4
(time periods; 0–5 min, 5–10 min, 10–15 min, and 25–20 min)
ANOVA with the last factor (time periods) as a within-subject de-
sign. High performers (M = 23.10) outperformed low perform-
ers (M = 18.04), F(1, 82) = 14.32, p < .0001. An interaction
effect between social context and low/high performers showed
a sharper performance decrement in nominal condition (M =
12.50) than interactive condition (M = 22.82) for low perform-
ers but a weaker performance decrement in nominal condition
(M = 20.19) than interactive condition (M = 24.96) for high
performers, F(1, 82) = 4.56, p < .03 (Fig. 9).
Moreover, analysis showed a main effect of social context
(F(1, 82) = 33.67, p < .0001), memory (F(1, 82) = 11.50, p <
.001), time (F(3, 80) = 33.67, p < .0001) as well as mem-
ory x social context (F(1, 82) = 5.97, p < .02), time x priming
(F(3, 80) = 5.88, p < .001) interactions were found to be sig-
nificant, which were in line with those mentioned above. The time
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interaction reflected the fact that the best performance occurred
and was maintained in interactive dyads with sequential priming
across time period, while the worst performance was more evi-
dent in nominal dyads with simultaneous priming, especially in
the middle and later period of brainstorming. In addition to these
analyses, we calculated correlations between dyads in interactive
and nominal conditions. There was a significantly high correlation
(r = .94, p < .00001) in idea generation performance between
dyads for the interactive group condition but a nonsignificant cor-
relation (r = .07, p > .97) between dyads for the nominal group
condition.
Lastly, there was a positive correlation (r = .74, p < .0001)
between the number of ideas and that of recalled ideas. This
outcomeprovided additional evidence for the attention-enhancing
effects of the memory instruction.
Discussion
Consistent with the finding of Experiment 1, Experiment 2
indicated beneficial effect of memory instruction on the idea
generation performance. Additional evidence for the attention-
enhancing effects of the memory instruction was also found by a
means of a positive correlation between the number of ideas and
that of recalled ideas. It increased the idea generation performance
by almost 29% as compared to the no-memory instruction. The gain
due to the memory instruction for the nominal group condition
was about 17%, whereas that for the interactive group condition
was about 39%. This outcome is also in line with the findings of
the previous research, indicating the beneficial effect ofmemory in
electronic brainstorming groups (see Experiment 3: Dugosh et al.
(2000)). From the associative memory or cognitive stimulation
perspective, memory instruction may facilitate the associations of
unique or new ideas in the memory since it may enhance both
storage and retrieval of ideas.
Interactive dyadswere found to generatemore ideas than nom-
inal dyads. Such a finding was consistent with the previous re-
search finding (Coskun, 2005a), It was also consistent with the
findings of studies which used either three person (Coskun, 2000),
four person (Paulus & Yang, 2000) groups, or dyads (Coskun,
2005a). This indicated that the beneficial effect of brainwriting
(e.g., its eliminative power of evaluation apprehension, social loaf-
ing, blocking, and downward matching) was evident at a dyadic
interaction level. Here, however, it should be noted that smaller
time periods (e.g., 5 min) were found to close the gap in perfor-
mance between interactive and nominal dyads when provided the
samenumber of paper slips (Coskun, 2005b). The findings of Exper-
iment 2 once again provided evidence for the presence of cognitive
stimulation in interactive brainwriting paradigm.
One could argue that in the second experiment, the dyadic
interaction could introduce some of the self-presentation effects
that are argued to be removed in written format—essentially
making predictions quite different from those found in the results
(e.g. evaluation apprehension because my partner will be reading
my silly ideas). Evaluation apprehension is not a problem in the
second experiment using the brainwriting technique for at least
three reasons. First, some scholars have argued that evaluation
apprehensionwasmore evident in oral brainstorming thanwritten
(electronic or brainwriting paradigm: see also Gallupe et al. (1991),
Nunamaker et al. (1995), Paulus and Yang (2000) and Valacich
et al. (1994)). Despite the fact that any subject in electronic
brainstorming or brainwriting condition may have a chance to
evaluate his or her partner’s ideas, expressing ideas with the
written format under high idea flow does not provide one enough
mental time to wonder off or criticize someone’s or partner’s
ideas. Second, when we examined this evaluation apprehension
possibility by calculating the sentences or words that mention
any criticism or agree/disagree statements, we found that the rateof these sentences to the whole sentences or the percentage of
these sentences implying social anxiety was less than one percent
(0.66%). In one of our previous studies done in oral brainstorming,
this ratio was almost 20%. Third, even though verbal messages are
perceived to be different depending on the nonverbal behavior
(e.g., voice tone, quality, pitch, gestures, and mimics), written
messages do not provide such salient clues to the perceiver or
partner. Given these considerations, evaluation apprehension is
minimal or absent in the brainwriting context compared with the
oral or face-to-face brainstorming context.
Though not being significant, interactive dyads seemed to
have a greater benefit from memory instruction than nominal
ones while generating their ideas. However, the power for this
interaction effect (.07) was small in the second experiment. The
estimated effect size for this interaction could be .11 in order
to reject the null hypothesis. According to the associate memory
perspective, memory instruction may especially enhance one’s
span of attention to the ideas generated by others, and capacity
of short-term memory. Consistent with this, it was found that
performance gain due to the memory instruction was greater with
brainwriting (29% gain: Experiment 2) than the nominal condition
(11% gain: Experiment 1). This may be due to the fact that nominal
brainstormers have to pay attention to their own ideas since
there is no other person or external stimulation in the nominal
situation to be paid attention. A lack of external stimulation or
the ideas generated by others (which is often more diverse than
one’s own ideas) may decrease one’s memory capacity or idea
storage and thereby the rate of idea generation. Despite of a lack of
any significant finding, brainstormers seemed to get more benefit
from paying attention to the ideas of others than focusing on their
own ideas. From this standpoint, it is obvious that future research
should be done with a greater sample size in order to evaluate this
possibility for an interaction effect.
Interaction effect between time and priming reflected the fact
that sequential priming led participants to successfully maintain
their initial performance level over sessions, whereas simultane-
ous priming led to a performance decrement over the session, es-
pecially after the end of the 10 min session. This finding is in line
with the finding of Experiment 1. This suggests that the detrimen-
tal effect of simultaneous priming becomes evident in the later ses-
sion of brainstorming. Almost the same type of pattern occurred
in a previous piece of research, in a way that participants de-
creased their performance level after 12min time periods. Success-
ful continuation of initial performance over a session in sequential
priming was also observed in oral or conventional brainstorming
(Experiment 1: Coskun et al. (2000)) and nominal brainstorming
with writing format (Experiment 2: Coskun et al. (2000)).
An interaction effect between a social context and low/high
performers showed a sharper performance decrement in a nominal
condition than an interactive condition for low performers but
a weaker performance decrement in a nominal condition than
an interactive condition for high performers. In other words, low
performers tended to match the performance of high performers
in the interactive group condition but this trend was absent in
the nominal group condition. Interactive dyads also showed a
greater degree of convergence over time than the nominal dyads.
Taken together, these findings mean that upward matching is
more evident in interactive brainwriting than nominal one. These
outcomes were in line with the findings of the Coskun et al. (2000)
study and modeling of Brown and Paulus (1996).
In Experiment 2, in contrast to Experiment 1, no significant in-
teraction effect between time andmemory (the effect size was .04)
was found (p > .10). Despite this non significance level, as with
Experiment 1, there seemed to be the trend for a sharper decline
in the no-memory condition than the memory condition over the
later time periods of the brainstorming session. This may be due
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Fig. 10. High and low performing members for the simultaneous case (non
cognitive).
to the fact that the strong or very constructed situation brainwrit-
ing (keeping track of ideas by others, paying attention, and gen-
erating ideas, and etc.) may override this interaction effect. Since
paying attention to the ideas of others is also present in interactive
brainwriting, such an extra componentmaymake this potential in-
teraction very weak. Since the number of observations is lower in
Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, this may contribute to this out-
come. Thus the future research should examine this possibility.
4. Comparison of experimental results with mathematical
modelling
Tables 2 and 3 show some comparisons between the results of
the experiments and those of themathematical model for memory
conditions. In the simulations, decay and matching coefficients
have been chosen to be 0.0235 and 0.2 respectively. The former
was determined from Experiment 1. For the simultaneous and
sequential cases, initially it is assumed that the rates of idea
generation are 1.75 and 1.25 for different members of the group.
We assume that the initial number of ideas for each person should
be different; otherwise there would be no matching, which results
in underestimation of the total number of ideas outputted by the
group. Another key assumption in the sequential case is that at
the fifth minute, the rate of idea generation is increased by 0.15
ideas/min for each member, at the tenth minute by 0.1 ideas/min
and at the fifteenthminute by 0.05 ideas/min. The freely estimated
parameter in this case is thematching coefficient and its best fitting
value is 0.2. The number of starting rates of idea production can
also be regarded as freely estimated parameters, and their best
fitting values are given as above.
The general trend of the simulations agrees quite well with
the experimental results. There are small discrepancies between
the results of experiments and simulations, which are normal,
considering the assumptions made by the model and statistical
deviations of the experimental results.
We think it is necessary to consider cognitive processes of
each individual to model the effects of the memory condition.
The memory condition will change the cognitive processes of
individuals, possibly causing a decrease in the decay coefficient
of idea generation, storage and output stages. Thereby it will
increase the number of ideas outputted, whereas in non cognitive
modeling there is no such mechanism to account for these effects.
As suggested by Experiment 1, in order to account for the memory
condition, the decay coefficient was chosen to be 0.0235 which
is smaller than the number (0.03) used for no memory condition.
The freely estimated parameters in this case are the matching
coefficient and the coefficient R, and their best fitting values are 0.2
and 1.0. Figs. 10 and 11 show the rate of idea production for high1.8
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Fig. 11. High and low performingmembers for the sequential case (non cognitive).
Table 2
Comparison of number of outputted ideas for 5min-intervals and relative errors for
the simultaneous case.
5th min 10th min 15th min 20th min
Experiments 14 16 11 13
Model-cognitive 10.7 16.0 14.5 13.3
Relative error %24 %0 %32 %2.3
Model-non cognitive 14.5 14.4 12.8 11.7
Relative error %3.5 %10.0 %16.4 %10.0
Table 3
Comparison of number of outputted ideas for 5min-intervals and relative errors for
the sequential case.
5th min 10th min 15th min 20th min
Experiments 13 15 15 15
Model-cognitive 10.7 16.0 14.8 14.8
Relative error %17.7 %6.7 %1.3 %1.3
Model-non cognitive 14.5 15.7 14.9 14.1
Relative error %11.5 %4.7 %0.7 %6.0
and low performingmembers for the simultaneous and sequential
cases respectively (non cognitive case).
The Tables 2 and 3 show that the non cognitive model does
better in the first half of the simulation and the cognitive model
does better in the second half. This is explained by the fact that in
cognitive modeling, an idea starts in the generation stage and then
moves to the storage and output stages. The whole process takes
time and the cognitive model underestimates the actual output
during the first 5–10 min.
The rates of idea production for high and low performing
members for the simultaneous and sequential cases with cognitive
processes are shown in Figs. 12 and 13.
We also notice that non-cognitive models fair better in
fitting the sequential priming data than they do in fitting the
simultaneous priming data. A possible reason for this is that, in the
former case, a sudden increase in outputted ideas at fixedmoments
of time somewhat counteracts the possible defects of the model.
This outcome is similar to the findings of Coskun et al. (2000)
study where simulations of the model described in that paper
showed that the capacity of short-term memory had no effect on
idea generation when categories were sequentially primed, since
sequentially-presented primes did not need to be maintained in
short-term memory.
Table 4 gives the values for coefficients used in the simulations.
Discussion about coefficients was given in the preceding para-
graphs of this section.
For Figs. 10–13, quantitative comparison with experiments
is not possible. The reason for this is that there are two freely
estimated parameters in the simulations – matching coefficient
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Coefficients used in the simulations of experiments.
Simulations Decay coefficient (s) Blocking coefficient (s) Matching coefficient R Initial valuesa Values of
jumpsb
Simultaneous case (noncognitive 0.0235 – 0.2 – 1.75
with memory), Table 3 1.25
Sequential case (noncognitive 0.0235 – 0.2 – 1.75 0.15
with memory), Table 4 1.25 0.1
0.05
Simultaneous case (cognitive 0.0235 0.0235 0.0235 – 0.2 1.0 1.0
with memory), Table 3 – 0.7
Sequential case (cognitive 0.0235 0.0235 0.0235 – 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.6
with memory), Table 4 – 0.7 0.3
0.15
a Rate of idea production for each member at t = 0.
b Increase in the value of rate of production at 5th, 10th and 15th min (value of increase is the same for each member).1.8
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Fig. 12. High and low performing members for the simultaneous case (with
cognitive processes).
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Fig. 13. High and low performing members for the sequential case (with cognitive
processes).
and the number of starting ideas – and these parameters are
varied to fit the total number of outputted ideas of the group,
not the rate of idea production of each member. But qualitative
comparison with experiments can be done and we can see that
in both cases that the low performing member is trying to match
his/her performance to that of the high performing member.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we tried to provide an alternative account for the
model developed by Brown and Paulus (1996). The simulations
produced a reasonable and good fit to the existing data in the
literature (Brown & Paulus, 1996; Camacho & Paulus, 1995) as
well as interesting outcomes for future studies. However, theverification of such a modeling obviously requires more studies
and experimental manipulations.
In addition to this modeling effort, we developed a modeling
that treated the sequential type brainstorming with impulsive
differential equations by assuming each category as an impulse.
We conducted the two experiments in order to assess the
verification of sequential and simultaneous priming with a
different paradigm that consisted of memory instruction and
brainwriting as compared to the previous studies (Brown &
Paulus, 1996; Coskun et al., 2000). Taken together, experimental
studies suggest that memory instruction had a beneficial effect
on the idea generation performance. However, presenting all
categories of the problem at every five minutes, regardless of
presenting them either at once or one at a time, eliminated
the potential difference between simultaneous and sequential
priming. However, consistent with the findings of the previous
experiments (Coskun et al., 2000), in both Experiment 1 and
2 the time and priming interaction reflected the fact that the
performance declined more with the simultaneous priming than
that with sequential priming over time. Consistent with these
outcomes but being different from the model of Brown and Paulus
(1996), our model considered a different number of ideas for each
person at the onset of the session, and treated these ideas as
an impulse to the system. The general trend of the simulations
based on these considerations seemed to fit quite well with the
experimental results.
The mathematical model produces quite good results based on
the input obtained from Experiment 1. We learn that the initial
number of ideas for each person should be different, so as to have
a positive effect of matching in brainstorming, in writing. (This is
almost always the case for laboratory groups, since people are ran-
domly selected.) Otherwise therewould be nomatching, which re-
sults in underestimation of the total number of ideas outputted by
the group. Also, based on the assumptions of the sequential mod-
eling, new categories introduced at the fifth, tenth and fifteenth
minutes have the impulsive effect of an increase on the rate of
idea generation for each person. Our assumption that in sequen-
tial cases each new category can be treated as an impulse to the
dynamical system is verified by these two experiments (Tables 2
and 3). Cognitive processes weremodeled in the hypothetical sim-
ulations and gave results that are more realistic than the non cog-
nitive cases do. Cognitive modeling is also necessary to account for
the memory condition. The simulations (Tables 2 and 3) verified
that the memory condition decreases decay, therefore making a
positive impact on the result. Overall conclusions are that the non
cognitive model does better in the first half of the simulation and
the cognitive model does better in the second half.
From an application point of view, organizations or companies
may benefit from sequential priming and memory instruction in
their idea generation sessions by keeping the performance level
264 H. Coskun, O. Yilmaz / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 53 (2009) 253–264alive over long idea generation sessions. For example, coworkers
may be instructed to pay close attention to the ideas generated
in the brainstorming sessions. However, it should be kept in mind
that a strong emphasis on the memory test at the end of a team or
groupmeetingmay lead to an increase in one’s evaluative concerns
in corporate or industrial settings. Thus the team leader should
be aware of this possibility and should not place more emphasis
on the memory test for it especially in the case of individuals
working alone. The findings of the current two studies suggest that
providingmemory instructionmay notmuch help one personwho
works alone. Coworkers in industrial settings may benefit from
sequential priming when considering too many different aspects
of the same topic or problem. Before giving the cases where a
group considers a problem for the first time, it would be beneficial
to have a meeting to identify the components of the problem.
Alternatively, the team leader may discuss the characteristics of
the problem and then subdivide those into smaller segments
before the brainstorming session starts.
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